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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 18 DEcmmm, 1964 NUMBER 1
Federal Power To Seize and Search
Without Warrant
Philip M. Carden*
Mr. Garden here explores the history and development of the power
of federal officers to seize and search without warrant. The study is
divided into the power to search persons, places, vehicles, and to seize
things The author concludes that, with a limited exception, no federal
power of search or seizure of persons or property without prior special
warrant can be derived from the federal constitution. Finally, the author
suggests that the Supreme Court may refuse to follow its dicta uphold-
ing the federal power to search and seize without warrant if the proper
case is brought before it.
INTRODUCIION
Federal law enforcement officers have power' to seize persons; 2 to
search them,3 their body orifices,4 blood vessels,5 pockets, 6 pocket-
books, 7 brief cases,8 automobiles,9 fields,' 0 dwellings,1 offices,12 hotel
*Member, Tennessee Bar.
1. Some judges and text writers refer blithely to an officer's "right" to search and
seize. For present purposes, however, the word "right" will be reserved for reference
to those rights of the individual that are protected by the Constitution against infringe-
ment by government. On the other hand, the word "power" will be used in the sense
of governmental power having some legal sanction and not to the naked power an
individual police officer can exert merely because he has weapons.
2. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
3. ibid.
4. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
914 (1958).
5. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Although this case involved state
officers, the state and federal standards are now said to be the same. Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
6. Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831
(1960).
7. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
926 (1952).
8. Draper v. United States, supra note 2.
9. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
10. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
11. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
12. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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rooms, 13 closets,'14 beds,15 safes and filing cabinets, 16 nooks and cran-
nies;1V and to seize their papers and effects, all without special war-
rants.
"Such is the power, and, therefore, one would naturally expect that the
law to warrant it should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant.
If it is law, it will be found in our books; if it is not to be found there,
it is not law."18
As the first seventeen footnotes indicate, the law is now to be found
in the books, but the questions are: (1) Who put it there? (2) What
books did he find it in? (3) Is it clear in proportion as the power is
exorbitant?
For purposes of seeking the answers to those questions, it may be
well to subdivide the power into its different applications as follows:
A. The power to seize persons (arrest)
B. The power to search persons




D. The power to search vehicles
E. The power to seize things
The sources of these powers will be sought, first, by reference to
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, second, by
reference to federal statutes, and, third, from the Constitution and
its history.
I. SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Seizure of Persons
The last case, as of this writing,19 in which the Supreme Court of
the United States upheld an arrest by a federal officer without a
warrant was Draper v. United States.20 The Court's discussion of
this power in its entirety follows:
13. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
14. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
15. Harris v. United States, supra note 11.
16. United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 12.
17. Harris v. United States, supra note 11.
18. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886), quoting from Lord Camden's
opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
19. Memorandum cases have not been surveyed.
20. Supra note 2.
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26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 7607, added by § 104(a) of the Narcotic Control
Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 570, provides, in pertinent part:
"The Commissioner . . . and agents, of the Bureau of Narcotics . . .
may....
"(2) make arrests without warrant for violations of any law of the
United States relating to narcotic drugs . . . where the violation is com-
mitted in the presence of the person making the arrest or where such
person has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing such violation."
The crucial question for us then is whether knowledge of the related facts
and circumstances gave Marsh "probable cause" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of §
104(a), supra, to believe that petitioner had committed or was committing
a violation of the narcotic laws. If it did, the arrest, though without a
warrant, was lawfu ....
Petitioner does not dispute this analysis of the question for decision.
21
The only case citations included in the text were clearly, by the
specificity of page references, given in support of the incidental search
rule which was omitted from the above quotation and will be dis-
cussed under Part B of this article. Two cases are cited in a footnote
in support of the proposition that "probable cause" and "reasonable
grounds" mean the same thing.22 No suggestion appears why the as-
serted equivalence between the constitutional standard for issuing a
warrant and the statutory standard for dispensing with the necessity
of a warrant has any relevance. The implication seems to be that
officers are governed by the same standard as magistrates-a propo-
sition the Court has subsequently had some difficulty with.2 3
In any event, both the Court and the litigants obviously assumed in
the Draper case that Congress had power to delegate the magisterial
and police functions to a single officer. Thus the point under inquiry
was assumed without citation of prior authority in Draper.
In United States v. Rabinowitz,4 the officers had a warrant that the
Court held was valid, but the Court added:
Even if the warrant of arrest were not sufficient to authorize the arrest for
possession of the stamps, the arrest therefor was valid because the officers
had probable cause to believe that a felony was being committed in their
very presence. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57.25
No mention of statutory authority appears and no source for the
power was cited other than Carroll. In Carroll, at the pages cited,
21. Id. at 310-11.
22. United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1957); cf. United States v.
Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1951).
23. E.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
24. Supra note 12.
25. Id. at 60.
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the Court discussed the common law rule of arrest without a warrant,
particularly in reference to its differentiation between misdemeanors
and felonies on which the petitioner in that case relied for reversal.
The propriety of federal officers exercising common law powers was
not discussed, no statutory authority was cited, and the decision did
not rest on the existence of such a power, the Court having found an
independent power to search vehicles without a warrant regardless of
any power to arrest without a warrant.2 At the pages cited in Rabino-
witz the Carroll opinion cited Kurtz v. Moffitt2 7 and Bad Elk V.
United States,2 each of which assumed without deciding that Con-
gress could constitutionally delegate power to arrest without a warrant
and decided that Congress had not delegated such a power in the
particular cases.
In Brinegar v. United States,2 9 the Court posed the question for
decision in terms of probable cause for arrest 0 but apparently de-
cided it on the authority of the Carroll case in which no probable
cause for arrest was found until after the search.
In Trupiano v. United States,31 the Court upheld an arrest without
a warrant but held the search and seizure of property was not prop-
erly incident thereto because the officers had ample opportunity to
get a search warrant and failed to do so. The Court's discussion of
the arrest point follows:
Reference is made to the well established right of law enforcement officers
to arrest without a warrant for a felony committed in their presence. Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 157, a right said to be unaffected by
the fact there may have been adequate time to procure a warrant of arrest.
Since one of the petitioners, Antoniole, was arrested while engaged in
operating an illegal still in the presence of agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit,
his arrest was valid under this view even though it occurred without the
benefit of a warrant....
We sustain the Government's contention that the arrest of Antoniole
was valid. The federal agents had more than adequate cause, based upon
the information supplied by Nilsen, to suspect that Antoniole was engaged
in felonious activities on the farm premises. Acting on that suspicion, the
agents went to the farm and entered onto the premises with the consent
of Kell, the owner. There Antoniole was seen through an open doorway
by one of the agents to be operating an illegal still, an act felonious in
nature. His arrest was therefore valid on the theory that he was committing
a felony in the discernible presence of an agent of the Alcohol Tax Unit, a
peace officer of the United States. The absence of a warrant of arrest,
26. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925).
27. 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
28. 177 U.S. 529 (1900).
29. Supra note 9.
30. Id. at 164.
31. 334 U.S. 699 (1948). This case was overruled two years later, but only on the
search point, in United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 12, at 66.
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even though there was sufficient time to obtain one, does not destroy the
validity of an arrest under these circumstances. Warrants of arrest are
designed to meet the dangers of unlimited and unreasonable arrests of
persons who are not at the moment committing any crime. Those dangers,
obviously, are not present where a felony plainly occurs before the eyes of
an officer of the law at a place where he is lawfully present. Common
sense then dictates that an arrest in that situation is valid despite the failure
to obtain a warrant of arrest.
3 2
Thus the only authority cited on this point in Trupiano is the same
as that cited in Rabinowitz, that is, the Carroll discussion of the rule
the Court declined to apply.
In Marron v. United States,3 officers executing a valid search war-
rant found not only what they were looking for under the warrant but
also found a person in the act of violating federal law in their
presence. The Court held the officers were justified in arresting the
person and in seizing additional property as incidental to the arrest
although not listed in the warrant.34 No authority for the arrest
without a warrant was cited by the Court.
That is the extent of the Supreme Court authority capable of being
construed as directly upholding challenged arrests by federal officers
without warrants. Of these, only Draper, Trupiano, and Marron un-
equivocally made the point a basis for decision, and of these three only
Trupiano involved action by officers who had neither a warrant nor
statutory authority. In all of them the existence of the power to arrest
without a warrant was assumed, and only its application was litigated
or decided.
All of these cases involved crimes committed in the presence of
the officers, but the cases show that the officers regularly act on the
broader dicta granting them power to arrest without a warrant upon
probable cause determined by themselves.m
B. Search of Persons
The inquiry here also begins with Draper. The pertinent portion
32. Id. at 704-05.
33. Supra note 14.
34. Id. at 198-99.
35. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); Brinegar v. United
States, supra note 9, at 164; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Carroll
v. United States, supra note 26, at 156-57. It has been said that the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1948), Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958), and Johnson v. United States, supra note 5, at 15, that a
federal arrest must be tested by state law in the absence of an applicable federal statute.
See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (minority opinion); Blakey, The
Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry, 112 U. PA. L. REv.' 499, 523, 524 (1964).
But all three of those cases involved arrests made jointly by federal officers having no
statutory power of arrest without warrant and state officers having such power. Miller,
supra at 305, and Di Re, supra at 591, specifically so limited the statement.
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of that opinion, somewhat overlapping that previously quoted in Part
A of this article follows:
If it did, the arrest, though without a warrant, was lawful and the subse-
quent search of petitioner's person and the seizure of the found heroin were
validly made incident to a lawful arrest, and therefore the motion to sup-
press was properly overruled and the heroin was competently received in
evidence at the trial. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392; Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 483.
Petitioner does not dispute this analysis of the question for decision .... 36
The Court's omissions from the list of citations and the specificity of
the page references in the citations given are both significant. The
Court was apparently unwilling to cite United States v. Rabinowit,
37
or Harris v. United States,38 each of which might have provided
stronger authority for the point.39 The specific page references in the
citations the Court relied on disclose the Court's awareness that in
each of the four cited cases, the rule of incidental search was not a
direct basis of decision.
The original dictum by which the incidental search rule was first
imported into Supreme Court law appears at the page cited in Weeks
v. United States,40 as follows:
What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifical-
ly, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It is
not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government, always recog-
nized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.
This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop on
Criminal Procedure, § 211; Wharton, Crim. Plead. and Practice, 8th ed., §
60; Dillon v. O'Brien and Davis, 16 Cox C.C. 245.
In tracing the line of authorities suggested in the above quotation, it
will be well to remember the phrases "always recognized" and "uni-
formly maintained in many cases."
The only one of the "many cases" the Court troubled to cite was
not an American case, nor even an English case proper. It was an
Irish case decided more than a century after the American Revolution,
and it apparently arose in the midst of an Irish revolution. 41 Even
36. 358 U.S. at 310-11.
37. Supra note 12.
38. Supra note 11.
39. The Court has since made its doubts about these cases more specific. See Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479-80 & n.8 (1963).
40. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). All the subsequent cases rely on this dictum either
directly or by citation of the line of authority tracing to it.
41. Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245 (Exch. Div. 1827).
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that court could find only three cases to cite as authority for its
decision, and it conceded that none of those three actually decided
the point for which they were cited but appeared to assume it.4
Finally, the actual point decided in Dillon was extremely narrow:
I desire to confine myself to the exact question which I think arises-that
is, to a case in which the allegation is not that there was a reasonable
suspicion of the plaintiff's guilt, but that he was actually guilty; that he was
arrested whilst in the actual commission of the crime, that the articles taken
were being at the time used in the commission of a crime; and in which
their materiality as evidence is also stated as a fact and not upon suspicion.
43
Obviously the decision of that limited question in a British court
can have little practical application to litigation of American rights of
privacy under a Constitution specifically designed to avoid evils ex-
perienced under British rule.
The two secondary authorities cited in support of the Weeks dictum
likewise fail to fully support the proposition when read in context. In
Bishop, the section cited should be read along with the preceding and
following sections." In Wharton,45 the cited section should be read
42. Id. at 248, citing Regina v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129, 173 Eng. Rep. 771 (1839);
Rex v. Barnett, 3 Car. & P. 600, 172 Eng. Rep. 563 (1829); Crozier v. Cundey, 6 B.
& C. 232, 108 Eng. Rep. 439 (1827). Crozier involved a search with a search warrant
in which items not listed in the warrant were seized and the victim was allowed dam-
ages. In Frost, money taken from the defendant was ordered returned without objec-
tion from the crown. In Barnett the court said money taken from a prisoner should be
returned if it was not to be used in evidence.
43. Dillon v. O'Brien, supra note 41, -at 248.
44. In 1 BISHOP, NEw CRnmNAL PNocznuRE (1913), the text of the three sections
is as follows:
"§ 210. 1. Keep and Search-Seize what-The officer should safely keep an arrested
prisoner until lawfully discharged; and if from violent conduct or other reason he
fears an attempt to escape, he may search the person and take away any imple-
ments therein. But this right is limited; for example, it does not exist where
the arrest is for mere disorderly drunkenness, and it is submitted to, and there is
no ground to fear an attempt at escape. Again,-
"2. Money and Other Valuables.-In the absence of any special reason, the officer
should not take anything from the prisoner's custody: for example, money, 'unless
it be in some way connected with the charge or proof against him, as he is thereby
deprived of the means of making his defence.' Nor should the watch of one appre-
hended for rape be taken; and where it was, the court ordered its restoration.
But-
"§ 211. 1. Bounds of Doctrine.-The arresting officer ought to consider the nature
of the accusation; then if he finds on the prisoner's person, or otherwise in his
possession, either goods or money which he reasonably believes to be connected
with the supposed crime, as its fruits, or as the instruments with which it was
committed, or as supplying proofs related to the transaction, he may take and hold
them to be disposed of as the court directs. And discoveries made in this lawful
search may be shown at the trial in evidence; as, marks and scars on the prisoner's
person; and if there are tracks supposed to be his, the officer may require him to
put his feet into them, or to take off his boots to be compared with them, the
result to appear in evidence at the trial.
"2. Statutes-in some of the States confirm or extend this authority. Where, on
1964]
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along with the following one.46 So read, the rule becomes much less
certain, uniform, and perpetual than the Supreme Court indicated.
Much of the text in Bishop is in terms of seizure alone without
indication of any distinction between seizure without search and
seizure upon a search. The search power mentioned in section 210
is conditioned on the officer's reasoned fear of an escape attempt. The
search mentioned in section 211 is conditioned on a consideration of
the nature of the accusation. And in section 212 the prisoner's con-
tinuing rights in any property seized are asserted.
In Wharton, neither section 60, cited by the Court, nor section 61
uses the word "search" at all. Furthermore section 60 cites no
authority whatever and section 61 is devoted to limitations on the
asserted authority to seize.
Turning to the authority cited by Bishop in support of the search
rule in section 211, ten case citations will be found.47 Of these, one
arrest for larceny, the officer was by the statute directed to 'seize and secure the
money, goods, or other articles alleged to be stolen, which shall be found in the
possession of such accused person, or which shall be waived by him in flying from
justice,' it was held that the shop of the prisoner might be broken open and the
stolen goods taken thence.
"§ 212. The Things taken-remain the prisoner's property. The officer, for ex-
ample, cannot appropriate such money to pay the expense of conveying him to
prison. He holds all, whether money or goods, subject to the order of the court;
which in proper circumstances will direct him to restore the whole or a part to
the prisoner. This power is exercised both in cases where the original taking was
wrongful, and where for any reason there ought to be a partial or complete re-
turning of the thing. Where a city marshal took a drum from one arrested for
beating it contrary to a by-law, then after the trial retained it to prevent a repeti-
tion of the beating, he was held to be liable to the owner in trover."
45. Reference herein is to WmRTo N, P LEADiNG AND PnACTICE (9th ed. 1889), the
8th edition being unavailable to the writer at this time.
46. Both sections follow:
"§ 60-Proofs of crime may be taken from person.
"Those arresting a defendant are bound to take from his person any articles
which may be of use as proof in the trial of the offence with which the defendant
is charged. These articles are properly to be deposited with the committing magis-
trate, to be retained by him with the other evidence in the case, until the time
comes for their return to the prosecuting authorities of the State. Sometimes, how-
ever, they are by local usage given at once to the prosecuting authorities. How-
ever, this may be, they should be carefully preserved for the purpose of the trial;
and after its close returned to the person whose property they lawfully are.
"§ 61-The right of the arresting officer to remove money from the defendant's
person is limited to those eases in which the money is connected with the offence
with which the defendant is charged. Any wider license would not only be a
violation of his personal rights, but would impair his means for preparing for his
defence. When money is taken in violation of this rule, the court will order its
restoration to the defendant. That where property is identified as stolen, or is in
any way valuable as proof, it may be sequestrated, is nevertheless plain."
47. Ex Parte Hum, 92 Ala. 102 (1891); People ex rel. Tamplin v. Beach, 49 Colo.
516 (1911); Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300 (1896); Woolfolk v. State, 81 Ga. 551
(1888); State v. Hassan, 149 Iowa 518 (1910); Getchell v. Page, 103 Me. 387 (1908);
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was an Irish case-Dillon v. O'Brien, previously discussed-and the
other nine were state court cases. In six of the cases, the varying
statements of the rule for which cited were dicta.48 Only three of
the opinions considered any constitutional questions,49 and of these
three, only one touched on federal law at all.0 Those mentioning
constitutional problems failed to present any rationale for the as-
sumption that the common law or statutory rule asserted was con-
sistent with constitutional principles. One of the opinions cited the
same section of Bishop, from an earlier edition, of course. Six of
the cases were decided more than a century after the adoption of the
fourth amendment, and the oldest case in the lot, Spalding v. Pres-
ton,5 1 was decided more than a half century after the adoption of the
fourth amendment. The Spalding case, which is cited in several of
the later cases, was not decided on any asserted common law rule of
incidental search and seizure but on "general grounds of preventive
justice."52 The opinion, in fact, was little more than an incoherent
roar of rage that anybody would have the gall to bring trover for the
return of half-finished counterfeit coins regardless of how they might
have come into the clutches of the law.
The citations in the nine opinions add but three additional cases to
the line of authority cited in Bishop.53 None is as old as Spalding and
none provides further authority in point antedating Spalding. How-
ever, one of them, Closson v. Morrison,4 provides what appears to be
the oldest case in the books linking the incidental search rule to the
United States Constitution. For this reason, it may be well to quote
the pertinent portion of the opinion in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against being de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, is secured
by the 4th and 5th amendments to the constitution of the United States,
and by articles 15 and 19, Bill of Rights, N. H. constitution.
But in the administration of criminal law, searches and seizures often
become, not only reasonable, but highly proper and necessary. The duty
of officers under search warrants for specific property in specified places, is
Thatcher v. Weeks, 79 Me. 547 (1887); Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1905); Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9 (1848); Dillon v. O'Brien, supra note 41.
48. Ex Parte Hum, supra note 47; People ex rel. Tamplin v. Beach, supra note 47;
Newman v. People, supra note 47; Woolfolk v. State, supra note 47; Cetchell v. Page,
supra note 47; Thatcher v. Weeks, supra note 47.
49. Ex Parte Hum, supra note 47; Newman v. People, supra note 47; State v. Hassan,
supra note 47.
50. Ex Parte Hum, supra note 47.
51. Supra note 47.
52. Spalding v. Preston, supra note 47, at 12.
53. Holker v. Hennessey, 141 Mo. 527 (1897); Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482
(1867); Houghton v. Bachman, 47 Barb. 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866).
54. Supra note 53.
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well settled: 1 Oh. Cr. Law, 57, 58; Com. v. Erwin, 1 Allen, 587; Halley
v. Mix, 3 Wend. 351. Our statute provides that 'any officer who shall find
any implement, article or thing, kept, used or designed to be used in viola-
tion of law, or in the commission of any offence, in the possession of or
belonging to any person arrested, or liable to be arrested for such offence, or
violation of law, shall bring such implement, article or thing, before the
justice or court, having jurisdiction of the offence, who shall make such
order respecting their custody or destruction as justice may require.'
And we think that an officer would also be justified in taking from a
person whom he had arrested for crime, any deadly weapon he might find
upon him, such as a revolver, a dirk, a knife, or sword-cane, a slung-shot,
or a club, though it had not been used or intended to be used in the com-
mission of the offence for which the prisoner had been arrested, and even
though no threats of violence towards the officer had been made. A due
regard for his own safety on the part of the officer, and also for the public
safety, would justify a sufficient search to ascertain if such weapons were
carried about the person of the prisoner, or were in his possession, and if
found, to seize and hold them until the prisoner should be discharged, or
until they could be otherwise properly disposed of. Spalding v. Preston, 21
Vt. 9, 16.
So we think it might be with money or other articles of value, found
upon the prisoner, by means of which, if left in his possession, he might
procure his escape, or obtain tools, or implements, or weapons with which
to effect his escape. We think the officer arresting a man for crime, not
only may, but frequently should, make such searches and seizures; that in
many cases they might be reasonable and proper, and courts would hold
him harmless for so doing, when he acts in good faith, and from a regard
to his own or the public safety, or the security of his prisoner.55
The most that can be inferred from this line of authority is that
by the middle of the nineteenth century, the custom of law enforce-
ment officers to search their prisoners and keep what they found had
grown into a source of litigation and that the state courts were of the
opinion that such a power should exist with limitations varying ac-
cording to the facts of the cases and the individual notions of the
judges. The judges did not 'look into the books" according to the
common law rule of Entick v. Carrington,56 or if they did, they did
not find the power there, or if they found it, they did not say where
they found it.
So far as this line of inquiry shows, the man that put this rule in
the books was Judge Redfield of Vermont whose temper tantrum on
paper in 184857 supplied enough law to satisfy such other judges as
were thereafter inclined to look in the books before deciding that
the common law sanctioned the incidental search rule.
55. Closson v. Morrison, supra note 53, at 484-85.
56. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
57. Spalding v. Preston, supra note 47.
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C. Search of Places
1. Dwellings.-In Abel v. United States,58 the Supreme Court up-
held the search of dwelling quarters (a hotel room) by federal
officers without a search warrant as an incident to an arrest under an
administrative warrant, but it did so only on the authority of the
previous Rabinowitz59 and Harris6 cases, which it emphasized were
not being reconsidered for reasons peculiar to the case at bar.61
Rabinowitz involved a search of an office and will be considered later.
In Harris, the Court upheld a five-hour search by five federal officers
of a three-room-and-bath apartment as an incident to a lawful arrest
under two valid arrest warrants. The Court reasoned as follows:
The Fourth Amendment has never been held to require that every valid
search and seizure be effected under the authority of a search warrant.
Search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is a practice of ancient
origin and has long been an integral part of the law-enforcement procedures
of the United States and of the individual states.
The opinions of this Court have clearly recognized that the search inci-
dent to arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate
control. Thus in Agnello v. United States, supra, at 30, it was said: 'The
right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons law-
fully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime
as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons
and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.'
It is equally clear that a search incident to arrest, which is otherwise rea-
sonable, is not automatically rendered invalid by the fact that a dwelling
place, as contrasted to a business premises, is subjected to search.
Nor can support be found for the suggestion that the search could not
validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner was arrested. Petitioner
was in exclusive possession of a four-room apartment. His control extended
quite as much to the bedroom in which the draft cards were found as to the
living room in which he was arrested. The canceled checks and the other
instrumentalities of the crimes charged in the warrants could easily have
been concealed in any of the four rooms of the apartment. Other situations
may arise in which the nature and size of the object sought or the lack of
effective control over the premises on the part of the persons arrested may
require that the searches be less extensive. But the area which reasonably
may be subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous cir-
cumstance that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted to
some other room of the apartment.
62
Thus the Court inverted the Entick rule approved in the Boyd case.63
58. Supra note 13.
59. Supra note 12.
60. Supra note 11.
61. Abel v. United States, supra note 13, at 235. See note 39 supra.
62. Harris v. United States, supra note 11, at 150-52.
63. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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Instead of looking into the books for a justification of the power and
taking their silence as a witness against the existence of the power,
the Court looked in the books and interpreted the silence as confirm-
ing the power and negating the right.
Of course, the Court did, by footnote, contend that the Agnello65
and Marron66 cases supported the extension of the search, but neither
of those cases went as far in its holding as the Harris court contended.
Agnello struck down the only asserted power that the defendant
contested on the very grounds that it was too far from the place of
arrest. In Marron, the extent of the search was not in issue because
a search warrant had covered the whole premises, and only the
extent of seizure was in issue.
The Agnello expansion of the Carroll67 and Weeks 8 dicta does not,
of course, go as far, even by way of further dictum, as the actual
holding in Harris. Furthermore, none of the authorities cited in the
Harris footnotes6 9 appears to support such an extensive and intensive
search as the Supreme Court approved. A study of those authorities,
however, does disclose one American case earlier than Spalding7 -an
1838 Massachusetts case involving a statute specifically referring to
arrests for larceny and permitting contemporary seizure of the stolen
goods.71 Compare this with the limiting dictum in Houghton v.
Bachman.72
An indication of the depth of the Harris Court's research in its
vain effort to support an insupportable holding was its citation of
Sheares's Case73 in support of the assertion that incidental search was
of ancient origin.7 4 Even Sheares's Case, however, is not quite as
ancient as the fourth amendment, having been tried in 1798. Further-
more, a reference to the page cited in the original report discloses
only that a letter presumably taken from Mr. Sheares's parlor or study
was admitted into evidence without objection or discussion of any
legal point. The relevance of the citation to the Harris issue is difficult
for this writer to follow.
Thus the law to justify a federal officer's search of dwellings with-
out warrant apparently found its way into the books belatedly by the
64. Harris v. United States, supra note 11, at 152 n.16.
65. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
66. Supra note 14.
67. Supra note 26.
68. Supra note 40.
69. Harris v. United States, supra note 11, at 150-52 nn.11-16.
70. Supra note 47.
71. Banks v. Farwell, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156 (1838).
72. Supra note 53.
73. 27 How. St. Tr. 255 (1798).
74. 331 U.S. at 150 & n.11.
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same process that brought in the power to search arrested persons.
2. Other Houses.-In United States v. Rabinowitz,75 the Supreme
Court backed off from two prior decisions. It overruled the main
holding in Trupiano v. United States,6 that a search could not be
justified as incidental to a lawful arrest if the officers had opportunity
to get a search warrant 7 and emphasized points of difference between
the case before it and the Harris case, particularly the fact that the
place searched was a single business room open to the public.7 8 The
search in Rabinowitz was upheld as an incident to a lawful arrest
in the office searched. In Harris the Court had indicated in a footnote
that the only difference between an office and a dwelling was that
"Stricter requirements of reasonableness may apply where a dwelling
is being searched, "79 citing two cases, including Davis v. United
States.
80
In Davis, the Court came very close to reading places of business
entirely out of the protection of the fourth amendment, at least where
Congress has established a power of inspection on some ground or
other. The particular congressional action involved in that case-
gasoline rationing-was taken under the war powers clause,81 and the
case was decided at a time when the Court may well have been af-
fected by both war psychology and favorable inclinations toward
economic masterminding. It may therefore be that the holding will
have no sequel. It has not, however, been overruled, and the same
sort of rationale appears more explicitly in a different context in
United States v. Morton Salt Co.P and similar cases involving business
corporations and administrative powers of investigation.
In incidental search cases, it seems likely that the only difference
will be in the standards applied in determining probable cause as sug-
gested in the Harris footnote and the Rabinowitz decision.
Inspection of the authorities cited in Rabinowitz discloses that the
ultimate source of this power, whatever it is, is the same as the source
of the powers previously discussed and that it is shrouded in the same
uncertainties as to origin.
3. Open Fields.-Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was a master at
annihilating an argument with a phrase. The damage he did to the
right of free speech by relating it to the right to shout fire in a
75. Supra note 12.
76. Supra note 31.
77. United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 12, at 66.
78. Id. at 58, 64.
79. 331 U.S. at 152 n.15.
80. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
81. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, el. 11-18.
82. 338 U.S. 632, 651-53 (1950).
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crowded theater8 may be vaguely gauged by reference to the number
of times lesser minds have parroted the phrase in less appropriate
contexts.
In Hester v. United States,84 with even more devastating effect,
Mr. Justice Holmes cooped up within four falls every American's
expansive right to be secure from unreasonable seizures and searches.
He did it with a dictum of a sentence and a half tacked onto a
decision already reached on other grounds: "[T]he special protection
accorded by the fourth amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The
distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law. 4 Bl. Com. 223, 225, 226."85
The pages cited in Blackstone concern the curtilage concept de-
veloped at common law in burglary cases. Mr. Justice Holmes, who
did not like to explicate the obvious for the benefit of fools, neglected
to explain the connection between the common law rules applicable
to burglary prosecutions and the scope of the fourth amendment. He
also neglected to explain the source of the powers to search and
seize, which are necessarily assumed in the act of determining that
the fourth amendment does not prohibit them. He also failed to
explain why the amendment would not, nevertheless, cover the
objects to be seized in open fields-say papers and effects-even if
the location were not protected from search. Perhaps some non-fool
will explain these obvious matters for the rest of us if the question
ever comes up again.
On the present record, however, the source of the federal power
to search private lands without warrant is Mr. Justice Holmes, who
found it in Blackstone by implication.
D. Search of Vehicles
Mr. Chief Justice Taft did the only really creditable job of support-
ing a federal power to search and seize without a warrant on be-
half of the Court. In Carroll v. United States,86 he showed first that
the officers were acting under the authority of a statute specifically
designed to enforce a specific amendment to the Constitution-the
eighteenth. This immediately linked the power to the Constitution
from which all federal powers must be derived. Then he showed that
the statute provided a different standard for seizures from moving
vehicles than from stationary places, and that the distinction was a
deliberate Congressional decision based on the rationale that the
83. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
84. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
85. Id. at 59.
86. Supra note 26.
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warrant procedure was not practical for movable vehicles. Then he
reviewed the fourth amendment cases and noted that none involved
a search of a movable vehicle. He then enunciated the rule he in-
tended to apply: that a search for and seizure of contraband from a
movable vehicle could be based on probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contained contraband.
Then he noted the language in Boyd v. United States,87 asserting
that customs seizures were in a class by themselves, and had been
so treated by Congress since the first import revenue act, the Act of
July 31, 1789.8 He then quoted the search and seizure provisions of
that act which required warrant procedure for the search of a "dwell-
ing house, store, building, or other place," but not for search of any
ship or vessel. The logic of this contemporaneous construction of the
fourth amendment is fully set forth. Then, to tie the whole argument
together, he pointed out that the particular load of whisky involved
in the case before the Court had been imported and was being trans-
ported from the port of entry inland at the time the contested search
and seizure occurred.
Although the applicability of the case to vehicles engaged in in-
ternal commerce may be less certain, it may be conceded that insofar
as movable vehicles involved in the import trade are concerned, the
power to search and seize without a warrant has been well supported
from the "books."89
E. Seizure of Things
The Supreme Court has not always distinguished carefully between
a search and a seizure in discussing questions primarily involving
search problems, and it has sometimes even used the phrase "search
and seizure" as the subject of a singular verb.90 In Abel v. United
States,91 however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with his usual thorough-
ness, made the distinction and some of its consequences quite clear:
Were the articles seized properly subject to seizure, even during a lawful
search? We have held in this regard that not every item may be seized
which is properly inspectible by the Government in the course of a legal
search; for example, private papers desired by the Government merely for
87. Supra note 18.
88. 1 Stat. 29 (1789).
89. The Carroll rule was applied to an internal liquor car search in Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931). However, in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949), the Court purported to follow Carroll although stating the issue in terms
of the incidental search rule, and in more recent cases of searches of vehicles the Court
has ignored the Carroll distinction and ruled in terms of the incidential search rule
entirely. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959).
90. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 365 (1964).
91. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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use as evidence may not be seized, no matter how lawful the search which
discovers them, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310, nor may the
Government seize, wholesale, the contents of a house it might have searched,
Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346....
Documents used as a means to commit crime . . . are seizable when
discovered in the course of a lawful search, Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192.
The other item seized in the course of the search of petitioner's hotel
room was item (1), a piece of graph paper containing a coded message.
This was seized by Schoenenberger as petitioner, while packing his suitcase,
was seeking to hide it in his sleeve. An arresting officer is free to take
hold of articles which he sees the accused deliberately trying to bide. This
power derives from the dangers that a weapon will be concealed, or that
relevant evidence will be destroyed. Once this piece of graph paper came
into Schoenenberger's hands, it was not necessary for him to return it, as it
was an instrumentality for the commission of espionage. This is so even
though Schoenenberger was not only not looking for items connected with
espionage but could not properly have been searching for the purpose of
finding such items. When an article subject to lawful seizure properly
comes into an officer's possession in the course of a lawful search it would
be entirely without reason to say that he must return it because it was
not one of the things it was his business to look for. See Harris, supra 331
U.S. at 154-55.92
It is to be noted, however, that even with his thoroughness, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter omitted to cite any statutory or constitutional
source of the powers he declared federal officers have. As his citations
indicate, however, the power of seizure in this context traces to the
same vague beginnings as the previous powers mentioned in this
paper.
It would unduly lengthen this paper to attempt to explore and
untangle the additional questions involved in the power of govern-
ment agents to seize contraband without warrant when no search or
trespass is involved, or to explore the related problems of congress-
ional power to declare private property contraband. 3
F. Case Law Summary
If the inquiry were confined to the majority opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the answers to the three questions posed
at the outset would be: (1) Except in the case of ships and vehicles,
the law was put into the books by judges sitting long after the fourth
amendment was adopted; (2) the judges got it from their own heads
or from books that did not purport to deal with federal powers or
92. Id. at 234-35, 238.
93. It should be noted, however, that the Court found no occasion even to mention
constitutional problems in the leading "probable cause" case involving internal seizure
without mention of search. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
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even the ultimate sources of state powers; and (3) its clarity falls
far short of being proportional to the exorbitance of the powers.
II. STATUTES
A. Seizure of Persons
The Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 195894 added the follow-
ing language to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954:95
Any investigator, agent, or other internal revenue officer by whatever
term designated, whom the Secretary or his delegate charges with the duty
of enforcing any of the criminal, seizure, or forfeiture provisions of subtitle
E or of any other law of the United States pertaining to the commodities
subject to tax under such subtitle for the enforcement of which the Secretary
or his delegate is responsible, may-
(1) carry firearms;
(2) execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants, and serve
subpoenas and summonses issued under authority of the United States;
(3) in respect to the performance of such duty, make arrests without
warrant for any offense against the United States committed in his pres-
ence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States
if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed, or is committing such felony; and
(4) in respect to the performance of such duty, make seizures of
property subject to forfeiture to the United States.96
The Senate Finance Committee, in reporting favorably on the bill
including the above delegation of power, 7 saw no occasion to discuss
the source of congressional authority to delegate such a power, and
made only the following comment on it:
Internal revenue officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal and forfeiture
provisions perform an important law enforcement function, and it is de-
sirable that specific statutory authority be provided for all such officers
similar to the existing statutory authority provided in the case of other
law enforcement officers who perform comparable duties (for example,
the authority granted to agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and to Customs
officers under section 7607).
The authority of internal revenue officers to make searches and seizures
without warrant under certain circumstances is well recognized, and it is not
intended that this section be construed as limiting any such existing
authority.9 8
The narcotic officers' section referred to by the committee had been
94. 72 Stat. 1275, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4216-26 (1958).
95. 72 Stat. 1430, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5001-862 (1958).
96. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7608.
97. S. REPx. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
98. Id. at 213.
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added by the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. 99 The House Ways and
Means Committee, in reporting favorably'0  on that bill likewise
mentioned no constitutional problem:
Because present law has proved inadequate and in some cases has placed
serious obstacles in the path of enforcement officers your committee is
recommending appropriate changes in the applicable statutes.
For example, recent court decisions have tended, under certain circum-
stances, to furnish the criminal with a cloak of immunity to the detriment
of society as a whole. These decisions have forced changes in recognized
investigative procedures which have been sanctioned by the courts for many
years. The narcotic traffickers, who are in most cases well organized profes-
sional racketeers, take full advantage of any limitations placed on enforce-
ment officers. In some instances enforcement officers have been restricted in
their right to arrest without a warrant, and to search and seize contraband
before and after a valid arrest. The use of evidence of admissions and of
confessions following an arrest has been curtailed. The enforcement officers
have been required to secure an arrest warrant or a search warrant, even
though circumstances indicate the impracticability of such a procedure. The
delay involved in obtaining a warrant permits the destruction or removal of
the narcotic evidence and allows the narcotic traffickers to escape prosecution
for their crime. These and other restrictions on enforcement officers leave
the public unprotected and give narcotic violators, especially the more
reprehensible, larger racketeers and wholesalers, an advantage over law-
enforcement officers in their efforts to combat the illicit narcotic traffic.
Accordingly, your committee urges that the corrective measures provided
in H.R. 11619 would provide for (1) authorization for more effective
searches and seizures in narcotic cases; (2) authority for Federal agents to
carry firearms, to execute and serve warrants, and to make arrests without
warrants for narcotic violations under certain circumstances; . . . (4) the
United States to have the right of appeal from certain court orders granting
a defendant a motion to suppress evidence or to return seized property.
•• 101
Thus appears the spectacle of Congress delegating a power to
officers who already had been exercising it by judicial permit, not
with any complaint that congressional authority in delegating powers
had been bypassed by the courts, but with the complaint that the
judiciary had not been sufficiently permissive. Yet the power dele-
gated is no different and no broader than that already recognized by
the Supreme Court. 02 This does little to remove the confusion about
99. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7607. See notes 21 & 23 supra and accompanying
text. The power granted for arrest without warrant in this section is essentially identi-
cal to that applying to felonies under § 7608. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
100. H. R. REP. No. 2388, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
101. Id. at 3283. That it may well be the Narcotic Control Act's extreme punish-
ments rather than any defects in enforcement powers that promotes crime has been
suggested in some of the responsible criticism of narcotic policies now beginning to
appear in general circulation publications. See, e.g., Straus, Give Drugs to Addicts,
Saturday Evening Post, Aug. 8-15, 1964, p. 6.
102. See the cases referred to in Part I(A), supra. The only broadening of the
search power in the act was in respect to issuance of night search warrants.
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federal arrest statutes noted in United States v. Di Re.' °3 Neverthe-
less, it indicates a clear legislative concurrence in the judicial rule
with respect to arrest without a warrant by federal officers. Further
evidence of such concurrence is not lacking in other statutes now in
force.04 For instance, United States marshals0 5 and Federal Bureau
of Investigation agents'06 have powers delegated in similar terms.
In addition, officers making arrests without warrants within these limi-
tations may search buildings maliciously without incurring the penal-
ties provided by statute for other persons searching buildings without
warrants.0 7 Even broader powers are conferred on coast guardsmen,
customs officers and conservation officers in limited circumstances.108
But, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Di Re case, 0 9 the
statutory evidence is conflicting. A number of statutes delegate powers
of arrest in limited areas without specifying whether a warrant is
required or not."0 Others specifically limit the power of arrest with-
out warrant to cases in which there is likelihood the person to be
arrested may escape before a warrant can be procured,"' and still
others specifically limit the power of arrest without warrant to cases
in which the offense occurs in the "presence" or "presence and view"
of the arresting officer." 2 None of these appears to be consistent with
a congressional assumption that all federal officers automatically have
a power to arrest persons without a warrant, except, perhaps, those
few sections that word the limitations in terms of specific prohibitions
rather than qualifications on the delegation. Even these prohibitions
fall short of showing any congressional concurrence in the desira-
bility of having federal officers exercising the full powers delegated
by the Supreme Court cases.
103. 332 U.S. 581, 590 (1948).
104. Because of the writer's limited access to older sources of legislative history, this
review is necessarily limited largely to the implications of the statutes themselves.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1958).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1958).
107. 18 U.S.C. §2236(b) (1958).
108. 50 Stat. 327 (1937), 16 U.S.C. § 772d(b) (1958).
109. Supra note 103.
110. E.g., Library of Congress guards, 64 Stat. 412 (1950), 2 U.S.C. § 167h (1958);
park police, 47 Stat. 1420 (1933), 16 U.S.C. §§ lOa, 415 (1958); forestry officers, 33
Stat. 873 (1905), 16 U.S.C. § 559 (1958); Secret Service agents, 18 U.S.C. § 3056
(1958); customs officers, 14 Stat. 180 (1866), 19 U.S.C. § 507 (1958); congressional
sergeants at arms and Capitol police, 60 Stat. 719 (1946), 40 U.S.C. §§ 193, 212a
(1958).
111. Immigration officers, 66 Stat. 233 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1357a(2), (4) (1958);
prison personnel, 18 U.S.C. § 3050 (1958).
112. Conservation officers, 58 Stat. 102 (1944), 16 U.S.C. §§ 631j, 690e, 706, 727,
852d, 959, 990 (1958) and 57 Stat. 304 (1943), 48 U.S.C. § 192 (1958); conservation
and customs officers, 18 U.S.C. § 3054 (1958); harbor inspectors, 72 Stat. 970, 33




This conflicting evidence to be found in the current sections of
the United States Code presents a more orderly and significant picture
when the confusion caused by codification is reduced by reference to
the chronological order in which the various provisions were originally
enacted.
As indicated at the outset, the Internal Revenue Service agents'
statutory authority dates only from 1958 and narcotic agents' from
1956. FBI agents' statutory power in present terms dates only from
1951113 when Congress eliminated the requirement of the original
1934 delegation"4 that the power be limited to cases in which there
was likelihood the person to be arrested might escape before a war-
rant could be procured. Marshals were first specifically delegated the
general power of arrest without a warrant in 1935.11 Before that time
marshals had only such powers in this respect as might be inferred
from the early delegation to them of powers analogous to those of
sheriffs in the several states."6 Thus the four groups of officers who
account for the vast bulk of federal arrests without warrants have
had specific statutory authority for it for less than thirty years. The
exemption of officers making arrests from the penalties for conducting
searches without warrant also originated less than thirty years ago."'
Application of the escape statute" 8 to persons in custody pursuant
to lawful arrest was also added in this period." 9 The rescue statute
12 0
has not yet been so amended.
Thus most of the statutory evidence in support of the general
rule has found its way into the books since the Supreme Court rule
was developed in the Carroll,'2' Agnello,122 and Marron'23 cases in the
1920's.
Of the other code sections considered, only one is as much as one
hundred years old, and that one derives from the 1795 statute gen-
erally giving marshals power analogous to those of a sheriff in the
respective states.m4
B. Search of Persons
In spite of the strong language about search powers quoted above
113. 64 Stat. 1239 (1951), amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 3052, 3107 (1958).
114. 48 Stat. 1008 (1934).
115. 49 Stat. 377 at 378 (1935), 28 U.S.C. § 504a (1958).
116. REv. STAT. § 788 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 549 (1958).
117. 49 Stat. 877 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1958).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 751 (1958).
119. 49 Stat. 513, 514 (1935), amending 46 Stat. 327 (1930).
120. 18 U.S.C.-§ 752 (1958).
121. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
122. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
123. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
124. Supra note 116.
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from the congressional committee reports on bills delegating to liquor
and narcotic agents the power to arrest without warrant'25 it is
noticeable that no specific power for search without warrant may be
found in either of those laws as enacted. 12 Congress thus was ap-
parently content as of 1956 and 1958 to continue to leave the power
of search to be delegated by the courts. But that is not the only
implication of the action. The committee's emphasis on evidence sug-
gests that Congress may have adopted the police officer's too-ready
assumption that the purpose of arrest is to get evidence instead of
vice versa.
However that may be, it remains true that Congress has been
sparing of specific delegations of general powers of search either of
the person or of property without a warrant. The present code ap-
pears to have only nine sections delegating powers to search persons
or their packages or baggage. Of these nine, five relate to the cus-
toms, 2 1 two to control of plant pests,'128 one to enforcement of con-
servation laws,'129 and one to liquor trade in the Indian country.130
The oldest of these provides for customs searches of persons in
language originally enacted in 1866.131 The next oldest"2 does not
provide for a search of the person although it specifies that packages
may be searched.
The only statute that appears on its face to recognize any power by
federal officers to search the person as an incident of a lawful arrest
does not delegate such a power, but merely provides a penalty for-
persons who exercise such a power on the pretense of being a federal
officer.Y3 This statute dates only from 1935, long after the power
had been recognized in Supreme Court dicta.13
C. Search of Places
1. Dwellings.-One code section dating from 1957 authorizes war-
rantless searches of "premises" for plant pests,135 and another dating
125. See text accompanying notes 98 & 101 supra.
126. INT. RFV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7607, 7608.
127. REv. STAT. § 3061 (1875), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1958); 46 Stat. 717 (1930), 19
U.S.C. § 1461 (1958); 46 Stat. 727 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (1958); 46 Stat. 747
(1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1958); 46 Stat. 748 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1958).
128. 71 Stat. 34 (1957), 7 U.S.C. § 150ff. (1958); 45 Stat..468 (1928), 7 U.S.C.
§ 164a (1958).
129. 50 Stat. 325 (1937), 16 U.S.C. § 772d (1958), derived from ,14 Stat. 178
(1866).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1958).
131. REv. STAT. § 3061 (1875), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1958).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1958), derived from 13 Stat. 29 (1864).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 913 (1958), derived from 49 Stat. 877 (1935).
134. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
135. 71 Stat. 34 (1957), 7 U.S.C. § 150ff (1958).
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from 1875 delegates power to search "places" without warrant for
liquor in the Indian country.136 This appears to be as close as Congress
has come to delegating power to search dwellings.
Some implication of congressional concurrence in the judicial decla-
rations on this subject appears by implications of two 1935 provisions;
one is the false personation statute 3 7 and the other the statute provid-
ing penalties for searches of dwellings without warrant.1' The im-
plication of the latter arises from the specific exemption of officers
making lawful arrests.
An implication of sorts tending the other way arises from the fact
that Congress has provided no authority for breaking doors to exer-
cise the incidental search power comparable to that provided for
officers serving search warrants. 39
This scarcity of statutory authority is consistent with the historic
congressional reluctance to provide a general power of search of
dwellings even with warrants. 40
The power to search dwellings without a warrant cannot easily
be attributed to the initiative of Congress.
2. Other Houses.-In addition to the two statutes authorizing war-
rantless searches of "premises" and "Places,"' 4 which might arguably
include dwellings, two other current code sections delegate powers to
search buildings in terms that cannot include dwellings. 42 These,
too, seem to have originated less than one hundred years ago in
special purpose statutes that have had little or no impact on the law
of search and seizure.
3. Open Fields.-Two additional statutes, other than those men-
tioned in the two preceding subsections, authorize entry on private
lands without warrants. Both of these originated in the last quarter
of a century. One provides for searches for opium poppies,'43 and
the other provides for entries limited to border patrol work.144 This
falls somewhat short of showing congressional approval of Mr. Justice
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1958).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 913 (1958).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1958), derived from 49 Stat. 877 (1935).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958). The Supreme Court, however, has obligingly sup-
plied the statutory omission by implication. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958).
140. See the extensive summary of this point in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946).
141. See notes 135 and 136 supra.
142. 35 Stat. 426 (1908), 33 U.S.C. § 446 (1958), ("manufacturing works" to pre-
vent harbor pollution); 21 Stat. 177 (1880), 39 U.S.C. § 700 (1958), ("any store or
house, other than a dwelling house" to keep down competition with the post office).
143. 56 Stat. 1047 (1942), 21 U.S.C. § 188g (1958).
144. 66 Stat. 233 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1958).
[ VOL. 18
POWER TO SEIZE AND SEARCH
Holmes's dictum reading open fields entirely out of the protection of
the fourth amendment.
145
D. Search of Vehicles
The only power of search without a warrant that has unequivocal
support from the statutes dating from constitutional times is the
power to search ships at ports of entry. As pointed out in the Carroll
case, 146 the same Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights provided
for customs searches of vessels without warrants in the first tariff act.147
Nevertheless, the current statutes show no great congressional pur-
pose to expand this into a general power to search vehicles of all
kinds except in limited classes of cases. For enforcement of the cus-
toms, the power now applies to land vehicles as well as vessels148
within the limits of the Carroll case. However, the power to search
vessels without a warrant has been expanded beyond the customs
field only in the conservation,'149 plant disease,50 and harbor pollu-
tion'5' statutes. Such searches of other vehicles for other than cus-
toms purposes are limited to searches for plants and plant pests, 5 2
aliens, 53 and liquor in the Indian country.TM
Of these current sections, only three antedate the Carroll decision
-those concerning liquor in the Indian country, customs, and harbor
pollution. And of these, only the provision for customs searches of
vessels antedates the Civil War.
E. Seizure of Things
Congress has delegated the power to seize property so freely and
for such a long period without providing warrant procedures as to
make a detailed survey here prohibitive. Suffice it to say that the
first Congress saw no difficulty about delegating the power to seize
property for the enforcement of import duties,' 55 and subsequent
145. See notes 84 & 85 supra and accompanying text
146. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
147. 1 Stat. 43 (1789).
148. REv. STAT. § 3061 (1875), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1958); 46 Stat. 747 (1930), 19
U.S.C. § 1581 (1958).
149. 58 Stat. 102 (1944), 16 U.S.C. § 631i (1958); 50 Stat. 325 (1937), 16 U.S.C.
§ 772d(a) (1958); 64 Stat. 1070 (1950), 16 U.S.C. § 990 (a) (1958).
150. 71 Stat. 32 (1957), 7 U.S.C. § 150dd (1958); 71 Stat. 34 (1957), 7 U.S.C. §
150ff (1958); 45 Stat. 468 (1928), 7 U.S.C. § 164a (1958).
151. 35 Stat. 426 (1908), 33 U.S.C. § 446 (1958).
152. See statutes cited note 150 supra.
153. 66 Stat. 233 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1958).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1958).
155. 1 Stat. 39 (1789).
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Congresses have expanded the delegation rather freely in support of
other measures.158
The power thus traces chronologically to constitutional times if not
logically to constitutional principles, and the power has been delegated
primarily by Congress rather than by the courts.
Nevertheless, seizures for general law enforcement purposes have
been authorized more grudgingly. For instance, FBI agents are em-
powered only "to make seizures under warrant for violation of the laws
of the United States." 57 Only revenue agents-the most recently
empowered large group-have general statutory seizure power.
158
F. Statutory Summary
Congress, clearly, has been much more reluctant to grant officers
power to act as their own magistrates than the courts have been, but
the power may now be found clearly in the statute books at least with
respect to seizures of persons and property.
Answering the questions posed at the outset as to how this body of
law came into the books: (1) Congress, of course, put it there; (2)
with the exception of customs searches and seizures of vessels, and
limited searches and seizures in the Indian country, Congress appears
first to have found it in the case books; and (3) it has been more
grudgingly delegated and therefore even less clear in proportion to
the exorbitance of the powers officers actually exercise than the court-
delegated powers.
Just as the case law search came to an end in the middle of the
nineteenth century with vague reference to state law, so the statutory
search ends with little relationship to the constitutional period.
III. TBE CONSTrUTON AND ITS HISTORY
No court seems to have approached the question of search or seizure
in terms of the fundamental federal constitutional rule that the federal
government can exercise only those powers delegated in the Constitu-
tion or necessarily implied as incidental to those delegated.5 9 The
original Constitution contains no specific delegation of power to seize
or search, and therefore any exercise of such a power must depend
156. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's comment at part A of the appendix to his dissent-
ing opinion in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 616 (1946).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3107 (1958).
158. INT. P-v. CoDE OF 1954, § 7608(4).
159. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 82 (1907); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816); United States v. Fisher, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 398 (1804).
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on implication. The power of arrest, of course, is essential to the
power to punish crime,160 and the unlimited power of legislation in
the District of Columbia and other federal areas 161 may be assumed
to have included both seizure and search powers so far as they may
be necessary to local law enforcement. If it were not for the fourth
amendment, however, there would be room for argument that the
powers to search and seize property were neither necessary nor proper
means for carrying out any of the purely federal powers delegated.
There still is room for argument as to its proper use in particular
cases, but the fourth amendment clearly recognizes that the powers
exist to some extent by providing a limitation on them.
For present purposes, it may be assumed that the powers, however
conferred and however exercised, are always used only in aid of a
legitimate federal power to which search and seizure are appropri-
ately incidental. The questions remain:
(1) Whether the courts may delegate the powers independently of
Congress other than by the issuance of special process.
(2) Whether the power may be exercised without a warrant con-
sistently with the fourth and fifth amendments.
The first question may be briefly answered. Even the power to
issue arrest warrants, though considered incidental to judicial power,
was for at least a century considered only in relation to the congres-
sional power to confer it on specific officers.1 And the power to
arrest without a warrant was specifically denied in the absence of
congressional delegation as late as the beginning of this century. 63
That the court opinions approving officers' actions without warrants
are legislative in nature and effect is a proposition too plain to admit
of serious argument. 64 The court's declarations of federal officers'
"rights" to search and seize without warrants are in fact treated as
general warrants' 65 issued to all federal officers in blank and in per-
160. Delegated specifically in U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 cls. 6 and 10, and expressly
mentioned in U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4 and art. III, § 3. It should be noted, however,
that these sections mention only counterfeiting, piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, offenses against the law of nations, treason and bribery, thus leaving much of
the criminal jurisdiction itself to implication.
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The different considerations applicable to local
law enforcement have been excluded from the present inquiry, but this by no means
concedes that significantly different results would be required in this area.
162. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280 (1897).
163. Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900). See also United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); see notes
27 and 28 supra and accompanying text.
164. In at least one case, a court of appeals has refused to give the Supreme Court
rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), more than the prospective effect character-
istic of legislation. Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963).
165. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy in Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 183 (1947).
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petuity, and they are therefore even broader grants of power than
any ever issued by an English court in colonial times in the form of
the hated general warrants or writs of assistance. 16 This is a patent
violation of the Constitution's careful separation of powers principle.167
It is not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and
not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 168
The second question may also be briefly answered for those who
can throw off the cliches learned in freshman criminal law long
enough to take a fresh look at the constitutional language. For those
who accept the Supreme Court's unadjudicated assumption that the
language needs interpretation, a more tedious analysis may be neces-
sary. But first, the short answer.
The first rule of constitutional construction is that if there is no
ambiguity in the language there is no room for construction. 19 Ap-
plying this rule, no need appears for construing the language of the
fourth amendment. 70 It plainly declares the existence' 7' of a right
to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures and then pro-
vides an exclusive method for initiating reasonable ones. 72 One de-
termined to avoid that procedure might argue that the amendment
does not say the procedure is exclusive, and therefore that other pro-
cedures may be devised. 73 But the argument implies that the authors
166. See LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FounTi AMENDMENT TO
Tim UNTrED STATES CONsTiTUTION 51 (1937).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
168. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
169. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957), and cases there cited.
170. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
171. The amendment does not create the right declared, but only recognizes it,
172. "The principle was that all seizures without judicial authority were deemed
'unreasonable.'" Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 605 (1946). Of course he, too, recognized exceptions to this obvious reading
and sanctioned reference to extrinsic evidence for the purpose, but he nowhere points
out the ambiguity of language that would justify the departure from the principle he
perceived.
173. Judges express this idea not by reasoning from an ambiguity but by parroting
the bromide from Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947), that "it is only
unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict," or
other phrases of similar vacuity. See, e.g., United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 100
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of the language trusted executive and police officers and distrusted
only judges.7 4 This is absurd. It may be that a wise public policy
could be developed on other procedures, but no other can fairly be
read into this language. 7 5 Besides, the argument overlooks the fact
that the Bill of Rights does provide language to supply the alleged
omission. The fifth amendment, the self-incrimination clause of which
has already been solidly woven into the fourth amendment by the
Supreme Court itself,176 also provides that no person shall be deprived
of liberty or property without due process of law.1 7 Seizure always
deprives a person of either liberty or property. Can it be doubted
that the procedure for finding and seizing it prescribed by the second
clause of the fourth amendment is the "due process" required in such
cases by the fifth? If there were doubts, would they not be dispelled
by the prospect of equating "due process" with "no process?" Finally,
can any citizen call himself "secure" when he must submit to any
federal officer or risk the outcome of an ex post facto determination
of something as nebulous as whether the police officer had knowledge
of facts on which he was entitled to assume he had "probable cause?" 17 8
Unless the fourth amendment language is arbitrarily mixed with
hornbook conceptions of common law rules applicable to local law
enforcement, it seems too plain for debate that when the federal
government undertakes to lay hands on a citizen, enter his premises,
or seize his property, it must invoke the warrant procedure. Since
(4th Cir. 1962); McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1962);
Price v. United States, 262 F.2d 684, 685 (10th Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States,
254 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 490 (2d
Cir. 1958); Bryant v. United States, 252 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1958); Lawson v.
United States, 254 F.2d 706, 708 (8th Cir. 1958); McGinnis v. United States, 227
F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir. 1955); Bradford v. United States, 194 F.2d 168, 170 (6th
Cir. 1952); United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1949).
174. The complaint against general warrants and writs of assistance at the inception
of the Revolution was that they "placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer."' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886), quoting from
James Otis's argument in the writs of assistance cases in Boston in 1761. See note 203
infra.
175. The legislative history of the adoption of the fourth amendment is slmpy,
particularly as to the manner in which the provision was changed into independent
clauses. But such as there is indicates strongly that the intent was to provide broader
rather than narrower protection. See LAsSON, op. cit. supra note 166, at 100.
176. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 634 (1886).
177. "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
178. In determining whether to resist in such cases, the citizen has no warrant
on which to base judgment, or even any recitation of the facts or supposed facts
on which the officer may be acting. If the citizen guesses wrong he may be exposed
to criminal prosecution for resisting. 18 U.S.C. § 2231 (1958).
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the Supreme Court has already arbitrarily so mixed the language,"'
however, it will be necessary to explore the historical context of the
fourth amendment in more detail.
A. Seizure of Persons
The right of the people to be secure in their persons . .. against un-
reasonable . . . seizures . . . shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing... the persons .. to be seized.
-U.S. CONST. amend. IV
No person shall . . . be deprived of . liberty . . . without due process
of law .
-U.S. CONST. amend. V
It cannot be denied that arrest without a warrant is a practice of
ancient origin. So are most of the practices outlawed by the Bill of
Rights. On the other hand, the use of warrants to authorize actions
against citizens dates from the earliest records of Anglo-Saxon law.180
The notion that the law of the land controls interference with liberty
from the initial capture, and not merely upon a prisoner's appearance
in court, dates at least from Magna Carta.181 And as early as 1256
an officer was held liable in damages for arresting an innocent person
and there was apparently no discussion of "probable cause."
182
At the time of the American Revolution, the common law made
distinctions between the authority of various local peace officers to
arrest without a warrant. According to Blackstone,la3 a justice of the
179. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Robertson v. Baldwin, supra
note 162.
180. See LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 166, at 20, quoting from the Mmnoun or
JusncEs (1290).
181. Reprinted in PEmRY, Souncs oF OuR LmERTIES 11 (1959). Chapter 39
provided: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or
banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him,
except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." (Emphasis
added.) The modem fashion of discounting Magna Carta on grounds it meant some-
thing different in the technical language of feudalism is pointless. Accepting the
contention, the fact remains that Lord Coke's interpretation intervened and provided
the meaning Americans had in mind when they demanded the liberties of Englishmen,
and this is the meaning that is pertinent in determining the relationship between Magna
Carta and the American Bill of Rights. See Pmmuy, op. cit. supra at 7; 1 CnurtmimL, A
HLsoRY OF TH ENGLISH-SPEAMNG PE OPLS at 255-57 (1956). LAssoN, op. cit. supra
note 166, at 19.
182. 2 PoLLocx & MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 583 n.1 (2d ed. 1898).
183. 4 BLAcESTONE, CoMwENTArIEs *292. The present discussion is limited to
Blackstone because the work was published on the eve of the American Revolution,
it seems accurately to represent the common law on the subject as of that time, and it
was widely accepted as such in the early days of the Republic. See Wilgus, Arrest
Without a Warrant, 22 MIGH. L. 1EBv. 541 (1924). The refinements usually included
in more modem statements of the "common law" of arrest reflect the work of nineteenth
century jurists and text writers.
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peace could arrest anyone committing a felony or breach of peace in
his presence; a sheriff or coroner could arrest any felon within his
county without a warrant; and a constable could:
without warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace, committed in
his view, and carry him before a justice of the peace. And, in case of felony
actually committed, or a dangerous wounding, whereby felony is like to
ensue, he may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon ....
Night watchmen could "virtute oficii arrest all offenders, and particu-
larly night-walkers, and commit them to custody til the morning." All
peace officers, in common with private citizens, were required to ar-
rest for felonies committed in their presence and upon "probable
suspicion also... arrest the felon, or other person so suspected," al-
though "such arrest upon suspicion is barely permitted by the law,
and not enjoined, as in the case of those who are present when the
felony is committed." 18 4 Also felons and those who had dangerously
wounded others could be pursued by hue and cry.185
It will be observed that all of these provisions apply only to com-
mon law felonies, except for breach of the peace in the presence of
justices of the peace, offenses falling within the purview of night
watchmen, and dangerous woundings. These, clearly, are narrow
provisions developed to meet the exigencies of local law enforcement,
not to carry out revenue measures and high state policy comparable
to the powers conferred generally on the federal government in this
country. With the possible exception of the areas of unlimited federal
jurisdiction,18 it could hardly have been in the minds of the authors
of the fourth amendment that any such exceptions would ever have
any application to enforcement of federal law.
But suppose all of Blackstone's exceptions to the rule of arrest by
warrant had been expressly written into the fourth amendment.
Would a revenue officer act by the rule applicable to a sheriff, a
constable, or a private citizen? What would the word "felony" mean?
The Constitution deals in things, not names, 8 7 and neither Congress
nor the courts could have assigned a new meaning to the word. Would
it mean those specific crimes deemed felonies in England in 1776-or
1790? Or those deemed felonies in one or more of the states in 1790?
Or would it be the standard of forfeiture that was outdated in Black-
stone's time or the capital punishment standard applicable in his
time?188 The authors of the amendment could hardly have expected
Congress to re-define the words willy-nilly by first defining felony in
184. 4 Br.LAcsToNE *292-93.
185. Id. at *293-94.
186. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
187. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 433 (1630).
188. 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra, note 183, at *98.
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terms of one year's punishment,18 9 and then scaling punishments for
individual crimes up and down according to temporary punitive
policies without thought of the constitutional impact. Surely words
read into the amendment by doubtful implication ought not to be less
certain in meaning.
The fact is that the common law exceptions could be read into
the fourth amendment in their 1790 meaning without validating any
considerable portion of the arrests daily made by federal officers
without warrant in the twentieth century.
B. Search of Persons
The right of the people to be secure in their persons . .. against un-
reasonable searches . . . shall not be violated ....
-U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The above attempt at extracting the constitutional language perti-
nent to this particular sub-topic discloses the only real ambiguity in the
fourth amendment. The second clause fails to mention searches of
the person, thus providing some basis for arguing that, at least in
searching the person, an officer might proceed without a warrant.
This distinction, however, has apparently never been suggested,' °
and if it were, the problem of seizure without a warrant would still
be posed. 191
Logically, this is the most easily supported of all of the alleged
powers of search without warrant. An officer may reasonably disarm
a prisoner and it is only a small step from depriving him of arms in
open view to patting his pockets to see if he has any concealed weap-
on. It is more difficult, however, to follow the officers (and the
judges who uphold them) into a prisoner's pockets, and thence be-
neath his clothes and into the interior of his body.92
Whatever power of search of the person was exercised in colonial
times in England, it does not seem to have produced any litigation.
Professor Lasson's exhaustive examination of the authorities seems
to have turned up none and the present writer has found none. The
earliest cases in either England or the United States appear to have
arisen nearly forty years after the American Bill of Rights was rati-
fied.'9 A single case in Queen Anne's time has been cited in a
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
190. The Supreme Court has assumed searches of the person to be on a par with
other searches. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
191. See subpart E infra.
192. See the cases cited at notes 2, 5, and 6, supra.
193. The earliest seems to be Rex v. Barnett, 3 Car. & P. 600, 172 Eng. Rep. 563
(1829), in which no question was made of search.
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seizure context, but the brief reported statement on the point is am-
biguous as to whether it was a seizure in the present sense or the
mere taking of a note for an unauthorized fee.19 By either reading,
the court disapproved the sheriff's action.
C. Search of Houses
1. Dwelling and Other Houses.-
The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against
unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched ....
-U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV
As of Blackstone's time, the common law provided no basis for the
search of any kind of a house without a warrant, unless a breaking to
capture a felon be deemed a search.195 The litigation and debate in
both the United States and England in the eighteenth century con-
cerned the issuance, limitations, execution, and return of warrants of
some kind or other.'9 And even these usually were not the warrants
of the common law courts, which seem to have been limited at that
time to the purpose of recovering stolen property.197 The warrants in
issue were the prerogative warrants inherited from the Star Chamber
by the Exchequer Chamber and the warrants of high administrative
officers of the king, none of whom felt themselves bound by common
law procedures. Indeed, on first challenge in King's Bench, Lord
Hardwick held himself without jurisdiction to rule on the validity of
these contested warrants.'9 But when the matter was finally brought
in proper form before the common law courts, judgments for heavy
damages were awarded and affinmed not only against those who
executed the void warrants, but against those who issued them.'9
The common law clearly considered the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant to be a judicial act.200
Therefore it is unlikely that the authors of an amendment to the
Constitution that so strongly emphasized the principle of separation
194. Regina v. Johnson, 11 Mod. Rep. 62 (1705).
195. 4 BLAcy.ONE, op. cit. supra, note 183, at * 292-93.
196. The best review of all aspects of these controversies will be found in LAssoN,
op. cit. supra, note 166, at 40-76.
197. This was the only example Lord Camden mentioned in Entick v. Carrington, 19
How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). See 2 HA.E, PL.ES OF THE CROWN 113 (1778), where he
disagrees with Lord Coke's opinion that even these warrants were illegal. 4 Coxn,
INsTrruTs *176.
198. Rex. v. Earbury, 2 Barn. 396, 94 Eng. Rep. 544 (K.B. 1733).
199. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Wilkes v.
Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Money v. Leach, 3 Burr 1692, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (1765); Entick v. Carrington, supra note 197.
200. 2 HALE, op. cit. supra, note 197, at 150.
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of powers could have anticipated that executive warrants could be
issued under the second clause of the fourth amendment.
20 1
The common law did provide a basis for distinguishing between
dwelling houses and other houses,20 but the contemporary history
does not suggest that the American colonists made any such distinc-
tion in a search context. Surely the merchants of Boston were more
concerned about the security of the smuggled goods in their ware-
houses than those in their private homes when they hired James Otis
to resist the issuance of new writs of assistance after the death of the
king in 1760.203 It seems much more probable that the authors of the
fourth amendment had the more general meaning of the word in mind
-the concept represented in such terms as warehouse, custom-house,
ale-house, coffee-house and House of God. Certainly the first Congress
so interpreted it,2 4 and the Supreme Court has generally done like-
wise.20
5
In any event, the fourth amendment was three-quarters of a century
old before searches of any kind by federal officers without a warrant
seem to have been even suggested.206 Similarly, state police practices
seem to have led to no litigation over a search of a building without a
warrant during the first half century of the republic.
207
2. Search of Open Fields.-
The right of the people to be secure in their . . .effects, against un-
reasonable searches . .. shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched .... -U.S. CONST. amend. IV
A distinction between entry upon land and breaking into a house
was made in the case of an owner seeking to recover his goods in the
fifteenth century,208 and the common law courts, in enforcing the
extreme penalties provided for burglars, made a distinction between
201. But the administrative warrant is with us yet. See Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960).
202. Penton v. Brown, 1 Keble 699, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1664).
203. Professor Lasson gives the balanced story based on careful reading of all
the usual sources and adds a few of his own. LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 166, at 51.
For a more dramatic account, see BoWEN, JoHN ADAMS AND THE ANERICAN REvoLUTION
203-19 (1950).
204. 1 Stat. 29 (1789).
205. Except for the implications of the Davis case as subsequently modified. See
the discussion of the point notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
206. See the discussions in Parts I and II(C)(1) supra.
207. The writer has found no case in which a court either approved or disapproved
a search of a building without a warrant or other process earlier than the 1838 case
of Banks v. Farwell, 38 Mass: (21 Pick.) 156 (1838).
208. See LAssoN, op. cit. supra note 166, at 74 n.78, citing Holdsworth's citation
of Y.B. Mich. 9 Edw. 4, 10.
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the mansion house, and other property.219 Nevertheless, the right of
property in land included the right to keep others even from bruising
one's grass,210 and trespass was and remains unlawful as to land, al-
though subject to milder penalties.
But the argument implied by Mr. Justice Holmes's dictum in the
Hester case,211 suggests that the authors of the fourth amendment did
not choose to extend its protection to open fields but only to houses,
papers and effects. The argument overlooks the eighteenth century
meaning of the words.
In 1783, the United States entered into a treaty with Sweden in
which the word "effects" was used, and that word has been uniformly
interpreted in cases arising under that treaty to include both real
and personal property.
2' 2
It is true, of course, that the original wording as submitted to
Congress was changed in committee to substitute "effects" for "other
property."2 13 But there is no indication that Congress had any idea of
doing more that smoothing the language as it did at the same time by
eliminating repetitions. Furthermore, all the evidence indicates that
the search and seizure provisions adopted during the same period by
the states were intended to cover precisely the same basic right, and
the various choices of words indicate a broad conception of the
coverage intended by such words as "possession:2 14 and "places."2 15
Finally the word selected in the second clause of the fourth amend-
ment as the subject of search was "place," which is certainly broad
enough to cover open fields.
This evidence is not conclusive, but in the absence of evidence to
the contrary the rule of liberal construction of the right against the
power should prevail.2 16 And if the logic of the rule of exclusion is
to keep the courts from being accomplices in the illegal acts of en-
forcement officers,217 no reason appears for drawing the line between
209. 4 BLACKSTONg, op. cit. supra note 183, at *223, *225, *226.
210. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 627 (1886), quoting from Entick v.
Carrington, supra note 197.
211. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
212. Adams v. Akerlund, 168 I1. 632 (1897); In Re Anderson, 166 Iowa 617
(1914); In Re Stixrud, 58 Wash. 339 (1910).
213. LASsoN, op. cit. supra note 166, at 100-01.
214. E.g., Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, art. X (1776); Tennessee Declaration
of Rights § 7 (1796). The latter has been interpreted as including a field far from
the dwelling house so long as it was possessed or occupied. Welch v. State, 154
Tenn. 60 (1926).
215. E.g., Virginia Bill of Rights art. X (1776).
216. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927).
217. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960), quoting approvingly
from the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 470 (1928), and the opinion of the Court in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
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illegal trespass on land and illegal trespass on other property. Either
would sully the temple.
D. Search of Vehicles
Vehicles are unquestionably "effects" by any definition. Whatever
may be the validity of the reasoning of the Carroll case218 as to
customs searches of ships and land vehicles at the threshold of United
States territorial jurisdiction, the extension of that reasoning to the
problems of internal law enforcement finds no justification in any
cases arising either before or after the prohibition era.
219
E. Seizure of Things
The right of the people to be secure in their . . . papers, and effects,
against unreasonable . .. seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing . . . the ... things to be seized.
-U.S. CONST. amend. IV
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of . . . property, without due process of
law ....
-U.S. CONST. amend. V
The only legitimate object of any governmental search is the dis-
covery of something to seize. Since the clear language of the fourth
amendment requires a warrant to justify a seizure, and the historical
evidence provides nothing persuasive to the contrary, by what reason-
ing are officers allowed to seize what they find in a search without a
warrant? Or if they might "reasonably" seize it, why should it not be
returned immediately to the court so that the officer's judicial act of
determining probable cause for seizure can be put to the test im-
mediately as in cases of seizure of persons? 2 °
Nothing in the historical evidence helps to resolve this fourth
amendment kicker that only Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears to have
perceived-and he only incompletely.2'
IV. CONCLUSION
With the exception of customs searches of ships at ports of entry
and seizures of dutiable goods, no federal power of search or seizure
of persons or property without prior special warrant or other pro-
218. See Part I(D) supra.
219. See note 89 supra.
220. FED. R. Cmm. P. 5.
221. See text at notes 91, 92 supra.
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cess,2 2 can be derived from the Constitution of the United States
either by reference to its language, its context, or its history. The cases
to the contrary that arose more than a century and a quarter after
the Constitution was adopted are not based upon a careful analysis of
the language of the Constitution or a complete study of its history.
They are based on hornbook conceptions of proper local law enforce-
ment procedures as developed in the state courts during the nineteenth
century.
These cases now have just a half-century of antiquitym to support
them, but "no degree of antiquity can give sanction to a usage bad
in itself."2 4 And the Supreme Court has often refused to follow its
own dicta in the face of what it deems a clear command of the
language of the Constitution.225 Who knows whether it will stand by
its dicta in this area until somebody brings the issue appropriately
before it?2
26
222. Other types of judicial process, such as executions, can justify searches and
seizures of property, of course. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 624 (1886).
223. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), was decided in 1914. Perhaps
this is enough antiquity to avoid contradicting the Supreme Court. See Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. at 150 (1947), text at Court's note 11. Mr. Justice Cardozo's
contention that it goes back to the days of hue and cry is hard to support. See People
v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923).
224. Money v. Leach, supra note 199.
225. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 176; Elkins v. United States, supra note 217;
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). A more directly analogous ex-
ample is the rule Greenleaf apparently made up out of whole cloth that a court
will not stop to consider how officers obtained relevant evidence, 1 GREENLEAF, Evi-
DENCE § 254a (10th ed. 1860). See Way, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained, 26
TENN. L. rEv. 332, 336 (1959). The Supreme Court quoted Greenleaf's rule with
approval in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1904). The Court's effort to
reconcile the Adams dictdm with the Boyd case, 116 U.S. (1886), resulted in the
development of the pre-trial motion to suppress evidence under the Weeks case, 232
U.S. 383 (1914). It took another half century of litigation to render the Adams case
entirely obsolete, as it now clearly is. See Elkins v. United States, supra note 216;
Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 176.
226. The Court has issued its invitation to the bar. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. at 480 n.8 (1963).
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